In light of the mounting tension and unrest that is happening in Ferguson, MO over the Darren Wilson-Michael Brown incident, I thought I would offer up some words about this case and the national attention it has garnered. Even though I have had a lot of thoughts regarding this tragic and difficult issue, and even though I have read a substantial amount of news articles since the shooting in August, I have held back saying or writing much about it (I did have a few Facebook posts early on, but since August I’ve only posted a few articles here and there). Yet I think now is the time to say something. It is important to put these thoughts down on paper before the grand jury reaches their decision and it is announced (possibly Monday?). Much discussion will follow that announcement, especially if any of the evidence from the grand jury meetings is released. Read the rest of this entry
Yesterday while I was making lunch I listened to the latest Reasonable Faith podcast, called “The Real Consequences of Atheism.” One thing that was said got me thinking and it was about how atheists explain the tension between the fact that, on the one hand, naturalism excludes any kind of objective and universal basis for morality, but on the other hand, all humans live as if there are objective moral values and duties that are binding on all people. As of right now, the reason I’ve read and heard given to explain this tension is that humans have developed the (false) belief in objective morality in order to function, even though it’s not really true. So, going off this, I jotted down this argument that attempts to reduce such reasoning to absurdity. Read the rest of this entry
What is truth?
Truth is a property that adheres to a proposition (the content of a sentence) if and only if the proposition corresponds to reality as it actually is. Propositions, as truth bearers, can be either true or false but they are not facts. Facts are neither true nor false; they just are. Facts are the standards by which the veracity of propositions are adjudicated. Nor are propositions sentences, which one philosopher defines as “a linguistic object consisting in a sense perceptible string of markings formed according to a culturally arbitrary set of syntactical rules, a grammatically well-formed string of spoken or written scratchings/sounds.”  Sentences would not be possible without propositions, but the two should not be conflated. Read the rest of this entry